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Abstract 
With regard to the purpose of the study to investigate the relationship between conservatism 
and quality of disclosure in listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange for the period of 2009-2013 
and correlation methodology, the study is quasi-experimental and post-events and in the field of 
PAT which is done with real information. In terms of the nature and objectives, it is an applied 
study. The statistical model used in this research is multivariate regression, and combined data 
technique is used to estimate the study models. One of the common effects, fixed effects and 
random effects will be used to estimate the appropriate models. Fisher test is adopted for 
implementation of combined data, and Hausman test is used to determine the type of panel data 
(common effects and fixed effects) and to analyze the research data and extracting the results, the 21 
SPSS was put into use. 
Keywords: conservatism, the quality of disclosure, conditional and unconditional 
conservatism, discretionary accruals 
Introduction 
The role of information in the field of economic decisions is vital; and without sufficient 
information, the investors wouldn’t appropriately identify the opportunities and risks of investments. 
To be effective on the decisions of the users of financial statements, the information must be placed 
at their disposal at the right time. Regarding the high sensitivity of financial information to the time, 
they may lose their value and usefulness in decision-makings over time. So, as the information 
provided is closer to the date of occurrence of the events, it will be timelier. In the financial 
reporting, this is true when the report publication date is close to the end of financial period. The 
purpose of financial reporting is to provide useful information to users. Useful information should 
be reliability and relevant. One of the components of the reliability of the information is the 
principle of conservatism. The technical committee of Iran accounting standards referred to it as the 
precautionary principle. Basu (1997) states that, conservatism is demonstrable difference for 
recognition of revenues and costs, which leads to low representing of profits and assets. Since there 
are conflicts of interest between managers and investors, during their tenure, the managers probably 
forecast profits and low represent losses. If the quality of information disclosure is low, the 
information asymmetries between managers and investors would increase, which lead to create the 
possibility for opportunistic earnings management; On the other hand, due to the costs of 
representation and bearing these costs by managers, they have incentives to provide high quality 
financial reports. The companies with high disclosure quality are expected to provide verifiable 
information in relation to financial performance, financial weakness, and other adverse events. In 
this regard, one of the qualitative characteristics of information is conservatism which is divided into 
two conditional and unconditional types Bassu (1997). Thus, the disclosure quality reduces 
information asymmetries. Asymmetries between managers and investors may reduce the possibility 
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of earnings management and investors have been led to increase their expected returns And with 
increasing conservatism in accounting, which in turn leads to improving the quality of information 
disclosure, manipulation of accounting information by managers as well as information asymmetry 
will be reduced; Therefore, high quality disclosure requires conditional and unconditional 
conservatism. High quality disclosure companies are less into earnings management, and have 
higher conditional conservatism and lower unconditional conservatism. The study was presented in 
the first part as an introduction on the topic, followed by a second part as the statement of the 
problem; in the third part, the importance and necessity of research, and in the fourth part the 
theoretical basis of the research are represented; the fifth part involves the research hypothesis and 
In the sixth part, models and analysis of descriptive statistics and correlations between variables 
have been stated and seventh part outlines the results of hypothesis testing and finally the results 
will be expressed in the last part. 
Statement of problem 
Accounting conservatism can be defined as the tendency to use a higher degree of 
Verifiability for identifying good news in comparison with bad news. Recent research conducted by 
Basu and Beaver and Ryan (2005) have divided the conservatism into two conditional and 
unconditional types. Basu (1997) states that, conservatism is different verifiability for recognition of 
revenues and costs, which leads to low representing of profits and assets. In 2005, he stated that this 
definition reflects conditional conservatism. The quality of information disclosure is one of the 
accounting principles which affect the financial reporting. Since the managers are responsible for 
preparing the financial statements, they can apply the disclosure policy to realize the main purpose 
of accounting and financial reporting which is to disclose and provide useful information for 
economic decision-making for financial reports users. On the other hand, the problem of information 
asymmetry leads to conservatism in accounting and financial reporting which considering the 
normative approach used in the development of theoretical predictions; this will improve the 
reliability and quality of financial information disclosure, and also reduce the information 
asymmetry. Conservatism is among the characteristics of financial reporting, which has long been 
intertwined with the theory and practice of accounting. In our country, in the theoretical concepts of 
reporting, conservatism has been recognized by the term precaution and has been introduced as one 
of the components of reliability which is a qualitative feature. 
According to the conservatism, accountants tend to have higher levels of reliability to 
identify the benefits and good news. In contrast, they tend to the lower degree of reliability for 
losses and bad news identification (Basu 1997). In other words, in profits and interests, bad news are 
paid attention faster than good news, therefore it creates the problem of information asymmetry. In 
general, this asymmetry arises between informed users (managers) and non-informed users 
(investors, shareholders, capital market participants) as a result of the reluctance of managers to 
disclose losses and their willingness to disclose profits. Information asymmetry caused by the low 
quality of disclosure increases the risk of investors, thus they would seek to increase their expected 
returns. So with accounting conservatism which in turn will improve the quality of information 
disclosure, the extent of manipulation of accounting information by managers will be reduced as 
well as the information asymmetry; finally, according to several studies about conservatism, the 
main problem in most studies is the lack of a comprehensive definition of conservatism. The aim of 
this study was to investigate this question: Is there a significant relationship between the quality of 
information disclosure and accounting conservatism of listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange 
or not? High quality Disclosure would reduce the information asymmetries, and asymmetries 
between managers and investors may reduce the possibility of earnings management; therefore, high 
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quality disclosure requires   conditional and unconditional conservatism, and companies with higher 
quality of disclosure is lesser into earnings management and have higher conditional conservatism, 
as well as lower unconditional conservatism. So in order to help managers and business unit’s 
stakeholders, the following topics will be discussed in this study. 
1) Do Companies with higher disclosure quality report lower discretionary accruals? 
2) Do companies with higher quality of disclosure, in comparison with those low quality 
disclosure ones, have higher conditional and lower  unconditional conservatism  
Significance of the study  
Since there are conflicts of interest between managers and investors, during their tenure, the 
managers probably forecast profits and low represent losses. If the quality of information disclosure 
is low, the information asymmetries between managers and investors would increase, which lead to 
create the possibility for opportunistic earnings management. On the other hand, due to the costs of 
representation and bearing these costs by managers, they have incentives to provide high quality 
financial reports .The companies with high disclosure quality are expected to provide verifiable 
information in relation to financial performance, financial weakness, and other adverse events. In 
this regard, one of the qualitative characteristics of information is conservatism, which has long 
history in accounting (Basu 1997). Accounting conservatism can be defined as the tendency to use a 
higher degree of Verifiability for identifying good news in comparison with bad news. Recent 
research conducted by Basu and Beaver and Ryan (2005) have divided the conservatism into two 
conditional and unconditional types. Basu (1997) states that, conservatism is different verifiability 
for recognition of revenues and costs, which leads to low representing of profits and assets. In 2005, 
he stated that this definition reflects conditional conservatism and unconditional conservatism is the 
identification of losses, independent of the type of economic news (such as research and 
development expenditure recognized as an expense). The limited conditional and unconditional 
types of conservatism are qualitative characteristics of the information which are important and 
essential to study the relationship between conservatism and disclosure quality. 
Theoretical foundation of the study  
With identification and evaluation of the effect of conservatism on the information reliability 
and timeliness of disclosure of companies, this study will provide applied basis for capital market 
players, including actual and potential investors and etc. Obviously in doing any research, it is 
attempted that the results will be used for efficient and effective decision making by those who are 
interested in; therefore, this study will not be exempt from this. On the other hand, the research 
results will be significant for corporate managers to strive for more positive results. In this study, the 
main variables of the research are presented as: 
Conservatism: Accounting conservatism can be defined as the tendency to use a higher 
degree of Verifiability for identifying good news in comparison with bad news Bassu (1997, p4).  
Conditional conservatism: conservatism is a post-event which is also referred to as news-
dependent conservatism, conditional conservatism, and time asymmetry of profit. This kind of 
conservatism is mostly effective on the profit and loss statement. According to this type of 
conservatism, the book value of the asset is reduced due to unpleasant news. While for increasing 
the value of assets, pleasant news with very high verifiability is required (Beaver and Ryan 2006).  
Unconditional conservatism: This type of conservatism is a post-event which is news-
independent and mostly has had an impact on the balance sheet and arises from implementation of 
those accounting standards that reduce the profit independent of the current economic news (Beaver 
and Ryan 2006).  
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Disclosure Quality: The process of Improvement in providing information is related to the 
business unit in the form of financial statements, annual reports, and analysis of the management, 
along with notes etc. So, on the basis of this information, shareholders and analysts make 
appropriate financial and investment decisions, (Johns, Arens and Lybart, 2009).  
Accruals: The difference between net income before unexpected items and non-continuous, 
and operating cash flows and it is divided into two parts: discretionary and non-discretionary 
accruals. 
The following will point out some external and internal investigations carried out in the 
context of this research.  
Literature review 
Dimitropoulos et al (2013) reviewed the effect of International Financial Reporting 
Standards on the quality of accounting information in companies listed in the Athens Stock 
Exchange. They showed that the adoption of this accounting standard resulted in an increase in the 
quality of accounting information in earlier recognition of losses, reducing the earnings management 
and increase the information content of accounting numbers. 
Tan (2013) showed that when financial reports are used by lenders, or lenders grant loans to 
bankrupt companies and appoint individuals to corporate restructuring after bankruptcy, so 
accounting conservatism will increase. The results suggest that if the firm funding carried out 
through debt, then the demand for conservative financial reporting would increase. 
Lin et al (2012) studied the quality of accounting information in German companies before 
and after the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards. They found that after the 
adoption of these standards, the quality of accounting information has risen in earlier recognition of 
losses, reducing the earnings management and relevance of information. Hamdan (2012) in Bahrain 
showed the large companies have more accounting conservatism than small ones. He found no 
relationship between accounting conservatism and earnings quality in Bahrain companies. Also, 
companies that have more debt are more conservative compared to other companies. 
Ruch and Taylor (2011), by reviewing the conducted research in the field of accounting 
conservatism, faced with different findings about the usefulness of accounting conservatism in 
improving the quality of financial statements. Accounting conservatism would result in the earnings 
management through creating accounting reserves, such as reserving doubtful receivables. On the 
other hand, they concluded that conservatism can reduce information asymmetry and improve 
transparency in the disclosure of financial statements data. The results of their study show that 
accounting conservatism can be used as an efficient contractual mechanism to prevent conflicts of 
interest between managers and shareholders, shareholders and creditors. 
Kravet (2012) showed that accounting conservatism reduces the managers' incentive for 
high-risk investments. He found that managers who implement higher accounting conservatism, 
carrying out less risky investments. Wang (2013), focuses the role of earnings conservatism to 
explore the effect of accounting conservatism on information asymmetry during the period 2002-
2011 in Taiwan. The results show that when a corporate's conservatism is insufficient, the 
relationship between conservatism and information asymmetry is negative and significant. 
Conversely, when accounting earnings are very conservative, there is a positive and significant 
relationship between conservatism and information asymmetry. 
Kravet (2014) in a study tried to examine the issue of whether conservative reporting (timely 
loss detection) reduces management incentives for potentially risky investments or not? The 
researcher conducted their study on companies active in the United States for the period of 1984- 
2006. The results showed that the accounting conservatism is negatively and significantly correlated 
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with the fear of education risk. Limitations of conservatism affect managerial incentives for venture 
capital even if the investments would be profitable.  
Doelman (2014) investigated estimates of management on the use of conservative accounting 
and showed that overconfident managers overestimate future returns of the company's projects and 
concluded that overconfidence will lead to financial reporting and lesser conditional conservatism. 
Muhammad Yunus (2014) investigated the effects of internal governance mechanisms on 
accounting conservatism. The results of the study shows that the Board of Directors who hold at 
least four meetings of the audit committee and have a higher percentage of independent directors 
and finance professionals, and would act more quickly to identify the bad news and good news-
related revenues. 
Lara (2015) in a study examined the relationship between accounting conservatism and 
efficiency of the company's investment. The results of the study suggest that more conservative 
companies invest more and also have more debt, and it will be also influenced by firm 
characteristics and problems of information asymmetry. 
Etemadi and Farajzadeh (2012) examine the impact of the earnings management and capital 
structure on profit conservatism. The researchers argue that the earnings management, regardless of 
whether it is increasing or decreasing, affects the profit conservatism and increase conservatism. 
Companies that manage their declining profit would report more conservative profit, which shows 
hyper-conservatism. Companies that through positive accruals, carry out increasing earnings 
management, exert lesser conservatism in their reporting. Capital structure affects the size of profit 
conservatism. Companies that, in financing, have used more of the equity have imposed more 
conservatism in measuring profit. 
Adham (2007) in a study on the role of accounting conservatism on earnings quality and 
stock returns achieved the following results:  
1) There is a positive relationship between accounting conservatism and the quality of 
earnings; the more    conservative procedures adopted by companies, the reported earnings will be of 
higher quality in terms of proximity to cash, and vice versa. 
2) There is no significant relationship between conservatism and size of the companies. 
3) There is a significant inverse relationship between tax savings and conservatism in 
accounting. 
Zadeh and Azad (2008) examined the relationship between information asymmetry between 
investors and the conservatism in financial reports. Their assumptions were as follows: 
1) The more information asymmetry between investors, the more conservatism in financial 
statements 
2) Changes in information asymmetry between investors leads to changes in the level of 
conservatism of financial statements 
They used Basu (1997) criteria to assess the degree of conservatism, which was previously 
described. Rezazadeh and Azad on the basis of this study concluded that if there is information 
asymmetry between investors, companies would report profit and loss with more conservatism. The 
asymmetric recognition of revenues and expenses in the financial statements is changed in 
accordance with the level of information asymmetry. They also found that by varying the degree of 
information asymmetry between investors, the conservatism in financial reporting increases.  
Noravesh and Hoseini (2009) have examined the relationship between the quality of 
corporate disclosures (including reliability and timeliness) and earnings management using 
historical data of 51 companies during 2002-2007. Research findings show that a positive and 
significant relationship exists between company's disclosure quality and earnings management. The 
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findings also showed a significant negative correlation between the timeliness of disclosure of 
corporate and earnings management; while no significant correlation was observed between the 
reliability of corporate disclosures and earnings management. 
Fakhari and Messenger (2013) studied the effect of conservatism and accruals quality on the 
investment efficiency. Results showed that conservatism increase the efficiency of companies' 
investment. 
Ansari et al (2013) investigated the effect of conservatism on earnings management based on 
accruals, the actual management of profit, and the general level of earnings management in firms 
listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange. The results show a negative relationship between conservatism 
and accrual-based earnings management, and also a positive relationship between conservatism and 
actual earnings management. The study also examined the effect of conservatism on the general 
level of earnings management. The results indicate that there is a negative relationship between 
conservatism and the general level of earnings management. 
Ramsheh and et al (2014) examined the relationship between accounting conservatism and 
over confidence of management and also the foreign monitoring effect on this relationship. 
Conditional conservatism was based on Khan and Watts (2009) regression pattern and two measures 
of unconditional conservatism were based on accruals and the difference between profit skewness 
and cash flows. The results show that there is a negative and significant relationship between 
conditional and unconditional conservatism and management overconfidence. In addition, the 
findings showed that the external monitoring reduces the negative effect of overconfidence on 
conditional conservatism, but it will not have the same effect on unconditional conservatism.  
Banimahd and et al (2014) studied on accounting conservatism and management bonuses. 
The results showed that there is a negative relationship between accounting conservatism and 
management bonuses. The evidence suggests that the management bonuses have a positive 
relationship with company’s size and profitability. But the results did not confirm a significant 
relationship between debt ratio and changing with management bonuses.  
Abbasi et al (2014) examined the effect of accounting conservatism on the risk of falling 
stock prices in terms of information asymmetry in the Tehran Stock Exchange. Khan and Watts 
(2009) Index was used to measure the conservatism; and multivariate regression model have been 
used to measure the risk of falling stock prices; Logistic regression models were used to test the 
hypotheses. The findings show that conservatism has negative and significant effect on the 
likelihood of stock price crash. It is noteworthy that this result is also true in terms of information 
asymmetry. The test results show that the conservatism is lesser when there is possibility for stock 
prices to fall, than when there is no likelihood of falling stock prices.  
Research Hypothesis 
According to theoretical basis and conducted studies, the hypotheses of this research are as 
follows: 
The first main hypothesis: higher disclosure quality companies report lower discretionary 
accruals. 
The second main hypothesis: higher disclosure quality companies adopt higher conditional 
conservatism in comparison with lower disclosure quality companies. 
Methodology 
This study is a correlation type of research and   regarding the purpose, it’s an applied 
research. Also the research design is quasi-experimental due to the use of historical data. The 
statistical population includes all companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange during 2008 to 2013. 
The sample consisted of companies that were accepted at Tehran Stock Exchange by the end of 
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2007, their financial period ends in March, their financial year has not changed during the period of 
study, and data needed to carry out this research is available. Based on the limitations, 600 
companies (companies in all years) were selected as the study sample. Information and data needed 
for the study were collected through the Tehran Stock Exchange official sites, including Research 
and Development and Islamic Studies (Rdis), Bourse information exchange company and Rahavard 
Novin software, and preliminary required calculations were carried out on Excel spreadsheet; then 
The final analysis was performed using  20Spss software. Multiple regression models and the 
statistical method of panel data were used to test the hypothesis of the research. 
In the operational definition, each of the variables are defined in such a way that they can be 
measured. In this study, the dependent variable is the conservatism and the independent variable is  
the disclosure quality. The main basis of the study hypothesis test is adopted from Rodriguez (2010) 
model; and to study the relationship between conservatism and disclosure quality, the relevant 
variable are included in the mentioned model. 
Model of Research Hypotheses 
Model (1) is used to investigate the relationship between disclosure quality and the amount 
of discretionary accruals. 
ti,,,4,,3,,2,10, *** εROAAQLNAAQOCFAQAQDAC titititititititi +++++= ααααα  
DACi,t   
Discretionary accruals 
AQ i,t : A dummy variable that indicates the quality of reported accounting information. If 
the quality of financial reporting is above average, it would be regarded equal to one and otherwise 
it'll be considered zero.  
OCF i,t: operational Cash flow. 
LNF i,t: The natural logarithm of total assets. 
ROA i,t: Return on total assets (net income divided by the total assets. 
The model used to investigate the relationship between disclosure quality and conservatism 
is based on Rodriguez (2010) and Ayatridz (2011) model. 
Model 2: 
ti,,,,7,,6
,,5,4,,3,2,10,
***
**
εCFDOCFAQOCFAQ
CFDAQAQOCFCFDOCFCFDDAC
tititititi
titititititititi
+++
+++++=
αα
αααααα
 
DAC i,t: Discretionary accruals (absolute value). 
CFD i,t: A dummy variable that represents cash flow sign. If the cash flow sign is negative it 
would be regarded equal to one and otherwise it'll be considered zero. 
OCF i,t: operational Cash flow which is scaled by total assets. The relationship between the 
quality of financial reporting and conditional conservatism is represented by 7α. The coefficient is 
positive in the sense that higher disclosure quality companies impose more conservatism compared 
to the companies with lower disclosure quality. 
To obtain the relationship between the quality of financial reporting and the unconditional 
conservatism, UC variable is used. UC variable is measured using model (3) (according to research 
conducted by Rodriguez, 2010). 
Model 3: 
)1(*)1( 54 =+== AQNOCFAQUC αα  
NOCF(AQ=1), the proportion of companies that have disclosed high quality accounting 
information and have reported negative cash flow. 
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Rodriguez (2010) showed that unconditional conservatism is independent of news, so only 
conditional conservatism provides new information. UC(AQ=1) is Used to measure the accruals that 
are independent of good or bad news, (Vander, 2007). This variable is inversely related to the 
unconditional conservatism.  
Calculation of discretionary accruals 
it is equal to the difference between total accruals and non-discretionary accruals. In order to 
estimate the non-discretionary accruals, cross-sectional Jones model is used. This study uses 
regression model as the remaining discretionary accruals DAC i, t. like researches conducted by 
Barto et al (2001), Kosari et al (2004), and Gomez et al (2006). 
ti,,2,1
1,
0, )
1( εPPEREV
A
AC titi
ti
ti ++∆+=
−
ααα
 
AC i,t: Total accruals in year t, which are scale with total assets of 1-t year. The Cash Flow 
method is used to calculate the total accruals. In the cash flow method, total accruals (AC) are 
calculated as follows:  
Model 5: 
tititi OCFEARNAC ,,, −=  
EARN i,t: Earnings before unexpected items and non-continuous operation. 
OCF i,t: Operating cash flows that can be obtained according to the following equation. 
OCF i,t =  Operating cash flow according to cash flow statement + dividend paid + return on 
investment and profits to finance Paid + tax-related cash flow. 
A i,t-1: Total assets in 1-t year. 
REV i,t :Δ : Change in revenue of year t, which is scaled by total assets of year t-1 
PPE i,t: Property and equipment of the year t, which is scaled by total assets of year t-1. 
e i,t: Error component of the model. 
Results of testing hypotheses 
At this point the estimation results of models (1) and (2) is presented using cross-sectional 
data. In cross-sectional method, the results of the study during 2008-2013 are presented.  
Table 1: The results of model (1) in different years 
ti,,,4,,3,,2,10, *** εROAAQLNAAQOCFAQAQDAC titititititititi +++++= ααααα  
Variable/ year  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Intercept  0.1 
(0.24) 
0.06 
(0.53) 
-0.11 
(0.19) 
-0.12* 
(0.06) 
0.02 
(0.53) 
-0.04 
(0.53) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 0.11*** 
(0.00) 
0.7** 
(0.02) 
0.06* 
(0.07) 
0.09*** 
(0.00) 
0.06 
(0.01) 
0.11*** 
(0.00) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ∗ 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 -0.01 
(0.16) 
-0.01 
(0.39) 
0.01 
(0.26) 
0.01 
(0.31) 
-0.01 
(0.23) 
0.00 
(0.94) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ∗LNA 0.00 
(0.98) 
0.00 
(0.61) 
-0.01 
(0.11) 
0.00 
(0.80) 
0.00 
(0.26) 
0.00 
(0.64) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴 0.36*** 
(0.00) 
0.46*** 
(0.00) 
0.29*** 
(0.00) 
0.19*** 
(0.00) 
0.46*** 
(0.00) 
0.20*** 
(0.00) 
Fisher statistics  (significance)  17.70*** 
(0.00) 
2.32*** 
2 
0.97*** 
9 
2.69*** 
0 
4.39*** 
5 
14.63*** 
(0.00) 
Modified determination coefficient  26.74% 32.64% 15.89% 26.81% 44.33% 22.39% 
*, **, *** are significant in 10%, 15%, and 1%, respectively  
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The results of model 1 
The results of model (1) by cross-sectional method for 2008 to 2013 are presented in table 1. 
Disclosure quality coefficient is significant in all years studied. This confirms the first 
hypothesis of the research in all years 
Testing results of model (2) 
The results of model (2) estimation by cross-sectional method for 2006 to 2013 are presented 
in table 2. 
The results of model (3) estimation 
The results of model (3) by cross-sectional method for 2008 to 2013 are presented in table 2.  
Table 2: Results of model (2.3) estimation in different years 
ti,,,,7,,6
,,5,4,,3,2,10,
***
**
εCFDOCFAQOCFAQ
CFDAQAQOCFCFDOCFCFDDAC
tititititi
titititititititi
+++
+++++=
αα
αααααα
 
Variable / year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Intercept 0.07 
(0.38) 
-0.09 
(0.32) 
-0.12 
(0.12) 
-0.14 ** 
(0.04) 
-0.09 
(0.19) 
-0.13 
(0.10) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶 12:17 *** 
(0.00) 
12:17 *** 
(0.00) 
12:15 *** 
(0.00) 
12:05 *** 
(0.02) 
12:11 *** 
(0.00) 
0.12 *** 
(0.00) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 -0.02 *** 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.42) 
0.00 
(0.77) 
0.00 
(0.51) 
0.00 
(0.31) 
0.00 
(0.93) CFD ∗ OCF 0.00 
(0.39) 
0.00 
(0.60) 
0.00 
(0.22) 
0.00 
(0.63) 
0.00 
(0.46) 
0.00 
(0.23) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 12:40 *** 
(0.00) 
12:44 *** 
(0.00) 
12:30 *** 
(0.00) 
12:32 *** 
(0.000) 
12:55 *** 
(0.000) 
12:37 *** 
(0.00) AQ ∗ CFD ***0.11 
(0.00) 
**0.07 
(0.02) 
*0.06 
(0.07) 
***0.09 
(0.00) 
***0.06 
(0.01) 
***0.11 
(0.00) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ∗ 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 -0.01 
(0.16) 
-0.01 
(0.39) 
0.01 
(0.26) 
0.01 
(0.31) 
-0.01 
(0.23) 
0.00 
(0.94) AQ ∗ OCF ∗ CFD 0.00 
(0.98) 
0.00 
(0.61) 
-0.01 
(0.11) 
0.00 
(0.80) 
0.00 
(0.26) 
0.00 
(0.64) 
Fisher statistics  
(significance) 
28.01 *** 
(0.00) 
33.37 *** 
(0.00) 
22:40 *** 
(0.00) 
18:59 *** 
(0.00) 
55.32 *** 
(0.00) 
24.55 *** 
(0.00) 
Adjusted coefficient   of 
determination 
37.12% 42.66% 31.06% 24.57% 49.58% 33.62% 
The results presented show that the intercept only in 2011 (-14.0) at the level of 5% and 2014 
(-13.0) at the level of 1% is significant. The coefficient of the dummy variable (CFD) is significant 
in all years studied. This is a confirmation of the second research hypothesis in every tested year. 
The variable of cash flow from operations is significant only in 2006 (-0.02). Cash flow from 
operations is not a significant variable in any of the years, but disclosure quality variable is 
significant in all years studied. The significance of Fisher statistic in all years indicates that the 
research model is significant in studied years. The adjusted coefficient of determination shows that 
in 2008 to 2013, independent variables explain about 37, 43, 31, 25, 50, and 34 percent of 
discretionary accruals changes. 
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Testing results of research models by combined data method 
For the first and second research hypothesis, models (1) and (2) were respectively estimated 
using combined data method. Basically, the panel data refers to the cross-sectional units over time. 
The models based on these data are called panel data regression models. In general, it can be said 
that the panel data enrich the empirical analysis. This is not possible when using time series or 
cross-sectional data. In fact, using cross-sectional data for several years has better and more reliable 
results and increases the explanatory power of the model. 
Testing the first hypothesis 
The first model is used to examine the relationship between disclosure quality and the degree 
of discretionary accruals. 
The results of the model are shown in table 3. According to the F statistic (equal to 17.05 ), 
we can conclude the model is significant at the 1% level and the Durbin-Watson statistic (99/1) 
assures the lack of correlation. The coefficient of determination is equal to 12%, which shows that 
about 12 percent of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the independent 
variables. Given the t-statistics and the significance level, it is concluded that all variables other than 
AQ * LNA are significant at 1% level. 
Disclosure quality variable coefficient is equal to -0.105 which shows significance at the 
level of error of less than 1%. The minus sign on the disclosure quality coefficient shows that there 
is a negative relationship between disclosure quality and the amount of discretionary accruals; which 
means by increasing the quality of disclosure, the amount of discretionary accruals would decrease. 
Table 3: The results of the first model 
Model 1 Coefficient T statistics p-value 
Constant value .0863 6.83 0.000 
AQ 0.0065 6.85 0.000 
AQ * OCF 0.00561 -5.12 0.000 
AQ * LNA -0.00105 07.70 0.000 
AQ * ROA +0.00660 1.60 0.113 
Model power Model validity 
R = -0.12 Durbin-Watson statistics = -1.99 
Modified R =6.3 F statistics of table = 17.05 
Model significance = 0.000 
Testing the second hypothesis 
The relationship between the quality of financial reporting and conditional conservatism is 
shown by AQ * OCF * CFD coefficient. 
Being positive of these coefficients means that companies with high disclosure quality have 
more conservatism compared to low disclosure quality companies. 
The results of cutting the model in table 4 show that according to the statistic F (equal to 
8.054), it can be concluded that the model is significant at the 1% level and Durbin-Watson statistic 
(1.93569) that assures the correlation. The coefficient of determination is approximately 50 percent, 
that shows about 50 percent of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the 
independent variables. According to t test and the significance level, it can be conclude that OCF, 
CDF * OCF and AQ * OCF * CFD variables are significant at 1% level and the rest of them are not. 
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Table 4: The results of the model (2) 
Model 2 Coefficient T statistic S significance level 
Fixed amount 0.071 7.69 0.009 
CFD -0.022 0.63 0.532 
OCF 0.046 4.45 0.005 
CFD * OCF -0.224 -5.95 0.0024 
AQ 0.056 1.64 0.104 
AQ * CFD -0.033 -0.7 0.483 
AQ * OCF -0.1219 -0.93 0.354 
AQ * OCF * CFD 0.076 7.30 0.004 
Model power Model assumptions 
R = 50.1 Durbin-Watson statistic (1.93569) 
Modified R = 14 F statistic 8.0544 
Model significance = 0.000 
 Hypothesis testing are summarized in Table (5) 
Table 5: summary of the research hypothesis results 
Hypothesis Hypothesis Result 
1 Higher disclosure quality companies report lower discretionary accruals. confirmed 
2 higher disclosure quality companies adopt higher conditional conservatism 
in comparison with lower disclosure quality companies 
confirmed 
Testing the first hypothesis: The first model is used to examine the relationship between 
disclosure quality and the degree of discretionary accruals. The results of the model are shown in 
Table 2. According to the F statistic (equal to 17.05), we can conclude the model is significant at the 
1% level and the Durbin-Watson statistic (1.99) assures the lack of correlation. The coefficient of 
determination is equal to 12%, which shows that about 12 percent of the variation in the dependent 
variable is explained by the independent variables. Given the t-statistics and the significance level, it 
is concluded that all variables other than AQ * LNA are significant at 1% level.  
Disclosure quality variable coefficient is equal to -0.105 which shows significance at the 
level of error of less than 1%. The minus sign on the disclosure quality coefficient, shows that there 
is a negative relationship between disclosure quality and the amount of discretionary accruals; which 
means by increasing the quality of disclosure, the amount of discretionary accruals would decrease. 
Testing the Second Hypothesis: To examine the relationship between disclosure quality and 
conservatism conditional regression model (2) was used. The results of the model are shown in 
Table 3. The relationship between the quality of financial reporting and conditional conservatism is 
shown by AQ * OCF * CFD coefficient. Being positive of these coefficients means that companies 
with high disclosure quality have more conservatism compared to low disclosure quality companies.  
The results of cutting the model in table (4) show that according to the statistic F (equal to 
8.054), it can be concluded that the model is significant at the 1% level and Durbin-Watson statistic 
(1.93569) that assures the correlation. The coefficient of determination is approximately 50 percent, 
that shows about 50 percent of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the 
independent variables. According to t test and the significance level, it can be conclude that OCF, 
CDF * OCF and AQ * OCF * CFD variables are significant at 1% level and the rest of them are not. 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
In this study, at first descriptive statistics of research variables were represented. Then the 
inferential statistics were dealt with and the research models were presented in the form of 
inferential statistics of hypotheses. To test the models, firstly the Chow test was used to determine if 
the panel method should be used or mixed and then the Hausman was used test for random effects or 
fixed-effects of panel method. Finally, the model was presented and the results of the classical 
regression assumptions for research models were explained. 
Disclosure quality and presenting reliable and relevant financial reports are among the most 
important issues in accounting and finance. By providing quality financial reports, companies can    
achieve better value and attract the attention of analysts and investors. Quality financial reporting 
helps to assess the performance of managers and right investment decisions. 
The quality of accounting information can increase by applying conservatism and reducing 
earnings management. In this study, it was assumed that compliance with disclosure requirements, 
resulting in decreased earnings management and the companies with high disclosure quality have 
higher conditional conservatism. To measure the quality of disclosure, the overall rating given to the 
company by the Stock Exchange and to measure earnings management, discretionary accruals were 
used. The results of this study showed that by increasing the quality of disclosure, the earnings 
management (discretionary accruals) will decrease. In other words, companies that comply with the 
disclosure requirements have lesser effort to manage earnings. This finding is similar to research 
findings such as Truman heart and Titman (1988), Richardson (1998), Shaw (2003), Tondlo and 
Vanstraln (2005), Noravesh and Hoseini (2009) and Ayatridz (2011). By examination of the second 
research hypothesis, it was indicated that by increasing the quality of disclosure the conditional and 
unconditional conservatism would respectively increase and decrease. In other words, the companies 
that comply with disclosure requirements are trying to reduce information asymmetries and also 
represent conservatism information. This result is similar to previous findings such as Xinjiang 
(2007), Guy and Vercia (2007), Qi and Wang (2010), Ayatridz (2011) and Rodriguez (2010). The 
results showed that there is an inverse relationship between conditional and unconditional 
conservatism. The companies with high-quality of reporting are lesser into the unconditional 
conservatism and this result is similar to previous findings, such as Xinjiang R. (2007), Wonder 
(2007), Rodriguez (2010), and Ayatridz (2011). 
Low earnings management and conditional conservatism are features of high quality 
accounting information. With regard to the relationship between these characteristics and ratings of 
disclosure quality, it is necessary for investors and analysts to consider the rank of disclosure quality 
as a measure of information quality (level of earnings management and conditional conservatism) 
and make their investment decisions on this basis; Because companies with higher disclosure 
quality, have lesser earnings management and higher conditional conservatism. As a result, they 
have lower information risk and information asymmetries.  
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